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LET’S NOT THROW OUT THE BABY WITH THE
BATHWATER: A UNIFORM APPROACH TO THE DOMESTIC
RELATIONS EXCEPTION
ABSTRACT
From questions of marriage equality to marriage dissolution, federal
courts are deeply divided as to when to engage claims concerning family law.
The divide is most evident in the courts’ treatment of the longstanding judicial
doctrine called the “domestic relations exception.” The domestic relations
exception divests federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over family law
matters, but which specifically? The answer to this question depends on the
circuit where a litigant files. Some federal courts determine that the exception
only divests them of hearing actions for divorce, alimony, or child custody.
Others conclude that the exception prevents not only those actions, but also
related matters such as child support, guardianship, or a breach of a visitation
agreement.
Other than the precise nature of the family law claim, more inconsistencies
abound. Some courts apply the exception only to diversity jurisdiction, while
others apply the exception to both diversity and federal question jurisdiction.
One would expect this variation to be the product of a traditional circuit split,
but alas, the inconsistencies persist even when an individual circuit is
examined in isolation.
The diverse inter- and intra-circuit treatment of the domestic relations
exception stems from the different weight courts place on the exception’s
underlying values: stare decisis, federalism, and access to courts. Some federal
courts only apply the exception because it has long been a part of precedent;
otherwise, they would overrule it. Other courts apply the exception rigorously,
concluding that family law matters are properly left to state courts, elevating
federalism ideas. Even still, there are courts that recognize and apply the
exception, but believe federalism should always take a back seat to a litigant’s
right to access a federal forum. This elevation of one value, often to the
downgrading or omission of another, results in the deep divide and
inconsistency that exists today.
The breadth of inconsistency matters: It matters to the father who feels that
although his federal rights have been violated, he cannot invoke the federal
court’s jurisdiction to receive a remedy that is most dear to his heart—the
custody of his children. It matters to the mother who brings a tort action,
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seeking damages as a remedy for the abuse her daughters suffered at the hands
of their father. And it matters to the divorcée, whose ex-spouse refuses to
uphold their alimony agreement, making day-to-day financial living extremely
difficult.
This Comment offers a new approach to the domestic relations exception.
It proposes a three-step analysis that properly accounts for the exception’s
underlying values: federalism and access to courts, as well as the value that
has kept the exception alive to this day—stare decisis. Should federal courts
adopt this Comment’s approach, a uniform application of the domestic
relations exception emerges, and from there, a proper scope will develop.
Although the exact contours of the exception’s limits will always be difficult to
delineate given the highly factual nature of family law inquiries, this
Comment’s proposed analysis offers a significant step toward establishing the
consistency concerning the domestic relations exception.
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INTRODUCTION
The domestic relations exception is a judicially created doctrine that
divests federal courts of jurisdiction over family law matters.1 Its origins trace
back to 1858,2 and as of 2017, it lives on,3 albeit in a state of haze. The
Supreme Court has given unclear direction regarding its application, leading
many lower federal courts to treat the exception inconsistently.4 Yet despite its
variance in application, the exception has made a permanent home among
doctrines of federal court jurisdiction.5 Although many scholars have
discussed,6 critiqued,7 argued for limiting,8 or offered alternative theories for
its existence,9 a three-step approach that accounts for all the values underlying
the exception, and one that will lead to a closer consensus on its scope, has not
been suggested.10 This Comment offers that solution through a three-step
analysis.
1

See Chevalier v. Estate of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2015).
See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 694 (1992) (describing that the statements that spawned
the domestic relations exception originated in dicta from the case of Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582,
599–600 (1858)).
3
See, e.g., Strickland v. Cty. Council of Beaufort Cty., No. 16–CV–1150 (JNE/LIB), 2017 WL 72398,
at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 6, 2017) (discussing the domestic relations exception).
4
See infra Part II.
5
See Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 694–95 (noting that the Supreme Court was “unwilling to cast aside an
understood rule that has been recognized for nearly a century and a half”).
6
See Mark Strasser, Congress, Federal Courts, and Domestic Relations Exceptionalism, 12 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 193, 230 (2012) (asserting that the Supreme Court “should articulate and apply a consistent
approach with respect to the conditions under which federal intervention in family matters is permissible”);
Thomas H. Dobbs, Note, The Domestic Relations Exception Is Narrowed After Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 28
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1137, 1166 (1993) (discussing the potential effects of the Ankenbrandt decision);
Maryellen Murphy, Comment, Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction: Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 577, 579 (1993) (discussing and critiquing the Ankenbrandt decision).
7
See Steven G. Calabresi & Genna L. Sinel, The Same-Sex Marriage Cases and Federal Jurisdiction:
On Third-Party Standing and Why the Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction Should Be
Overruled, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 708, 754–55 (2016) (arguing that the domestic relations exception is “archaic,
inequitable, and ought to be overruled”).
8
See Bradley G. Silverman, Federal Questions and the Domestic-Relations Exception, 125 YALE L.J.
1364, 1397 (2016) (arguing that “[t]he domestic-relations exception does not and cannot, as a matter of
positive law, limit federal-question jurisdiction”); see also Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal
Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 198 (2009) (describing and critiquing federal courts’ willingness to
expand the exception to include federal question cases).
9
See Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073, 1076
(1994) (concluding that domestic relations cases may appear in federal courts and that the exception is more
fully explained due to underlying biases against both women and families); James E. Pfander & Emily K.
Damrau, A Non-Contentious Account of Article III’s Domestic Relations Exception, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
117, 149 (2016) (offering an explanation of the domestic relations exception that is grounded in Article III’s
distinction between “cases” and “controversies”).
10
In his 1995 article, Professor Michael Ashley Stein offers a new type of abstention, Ankenbrandt
abstention, to account for when federal courts should exercise jurisdiction over domestic relations matters. See
2
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One may question the continued vitality of the domestic relations exception
given the vast amount of federal court involvement in family law matters. For
example, in the recent landmark case Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court
held that same-sex individuals have a fundamental right to marry.11 Moreover,
under its Commerce, Full Faith and Credit, and Spending Clause powers,
Congress has passed many laws in the area of domestic relations.12 Of course,
being that it is the federal judiciary’s “province and duty” to say what the law
is,13 federal courts routinely review these laws.14 Yet despite the large quantity
of family law activity in the federal sphere, the domestic relations exception
survives, albeit inconsistently applied in federal courts across the country.
To demonstrate that inconsistency, consider the following factual scenario:
A divorced mother and father are entrenched in a bitter legal dispute
concerning their children’s custody and visitation. The mother has filed claims
in her state court and in the state court where the father is domiciled. Relying
on diversity jurisdiction (because the mother seeks damages exceeding
$75,000 and she meets the complete diversity requirement),15 she files a claim
in her federal court for tortious interference with visitation rights.16
Under the current approaches used by the federal circuits, this suit would
result in a variety of procedural outcomes. Some circuits would permit the case
to go forward since the mother is not suing for divorce, alimony, or child
custody.17 Other circuits would apply the exception, noting that the suit is too
closely involved with domestic relations matters.18 The practical result is that
in one circuit, the mother may receive true vindication of her wrongs, but in

Michael Ashley Stein, The Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction: Rethinking an Unsettled
Federal Courts Doctrine, 36 B.C. L. REV. 669, 703–05 (1995). While Stein’s piece describes a uniform
approach to the exception, it does not include a discussion of recently decided Supreme Court cases or the
complex circuit split as it exists today. See id.
11
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
12
E.g., Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2012).
13
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
14
See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1196–97 (D. Kan. 1998) (noting that a
federal law on child support collection was constitutional on its face as a valid exercise of power under the
Spending Clause).
15
To meet the requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction, the party invoking the federal court’s
jurisdiction must demonstrate that the parties are completely diverse from one another and must satisfy the
amount in controversy requirement. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806).
16
This factual scenario is loosely based on the case Ervin v. Estopare, No. CV 08–122–M–DWM–JCL,
2009 WL 50169, at *2 (D. Mont. Jan. 6, 2009).
17
E.g., Estopare, 2009 WL 50169, at *4.
18
E.g., Fischer v. Clark, No. 08–CV–3807(JS)(ARL), 2009 WL 3063313, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24,
2009).
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another, she will never have her day in court, or more blatantly, may never
receive custody of her children.
The conflicting treatment of the domestic relations exception stems from
the different weight federal courts place on the exception’s three underlying
values: (1) stare decisis, (2) federalism, and (3) access to courts.
The first value, stare decisis, is the “obligation to follow precedent.”19
While it is not an “inexorable command,” a previous ruling should only be
overruled if, for example, the rule has been found unworkable or the premises
of fact on which the rule was based have so far changed as to render the rule
somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable.20 Since it is debatable, at best, that the
exception has met this standard to warrant overruling, courts reason that they
will continue to follow the doctrine.21
The second underlying value of the domestic relations exception is
federalism. In the context of federal courts, federalism could mean deference22
or the belief and recognition that some areas of the law are traditionally left to
the states to govern.23 When the Supreme Court famously defined “Our
Federalism,” it observed that the concept encompasses both of these ideas.24
The Court noted that federalism represents “a system in which there is
sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both [s]tate and [n]ational
[g]overnments, and in which the [n]ational [g]overnment, anxious . . . to
vindicate and protect federal rights . . . , always endeavors to do so in ways that
will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the [s]tates.”25 This
model, in the realm of the domestic relations exception, means that the federal
government should always uphold federal rights regarding the family. But, it
should do so in a way that leaves the bulk of family law, an area traditionally
regulated by the states, to the states.

19

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,
405–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
21
See, e.g., Norton v. McOsker, 407 F.3d 501, 505 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The domestic relations exception
‘divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.’” (quoting
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992))); United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1231 (5th Cir.
1997) (“Federal courts have long divested themselves of jurisdiction over only the issuance of divorce,
alimony, and child custody decrees . . . .”).
22
See, e.g., Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 292–93 (2013) (applying deference to the state court’s
opinion in a federal habeas corpus petition).
23
See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (describing the “prominence of [s]tates in
matters of public health and safety”).
24
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
25
Id.
20
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The final value that informs the domestic relations exception is access to
courts, specifically access to a federal forum. The First Amendment guarantees
the right to petition the government,26 but to gain access to a federal forum, the
litigant must demonstrate that the federal court has subject matter
jurisdiction.27 Together, Article III28 and federal statutes provide two main
types of jurisdiction: federal question jurisdiction29 and diversity jurisdiction.30
Federal question jurisdiction exists in “civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,”31 while diversity
jurisdiction exists in litigation between citizens of different states when the
amount in controversy is satisfied.32 Both methods of jurisdiction provide
access to a federal forum, but the domestic relations exception strips federal
courts of that jurisdiction.33 To limit such a harsh result (i.e., meeting the
requirements for either type of federal court jurisdiction, but having it taken
away due to the doctrine), some federal courts seek to apply the exception as
little as possible, holding on to the timeless charge that federal courts “have no
more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp
that which is not given.”34
Because these values are in direct tension with one another, courts tend to
elevate one of them to the omission or downgrading of another. This results in
the inconsistent application of the domestic relations exception. For example,
the courts that value federalism will rigorously apply the exception, reasoning
that family law matters should be left to the states.35 On the other hand,

26

Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 387 (2011).
FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
28
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to
Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens
of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”).
29
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
30
Id. § 1332.
31
Id. § 1331.
32
Id. § 1332(a)(1). The traditional justification for diversity jurisdiction has been fear of bias against
out-of-state litigants, although other explanations, such as the need to encourage interstate commerce and to
make available “superior” federal courts, have also been suggested. See Adrienne J. Marsh, Diversity
Jurisdiction: Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 197, 199–200 (1982).
33
Chevalier v. Estate of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2015).
34
Id. at 795 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 289–99
(2006)).
35
See, e.g., Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying the domestic relations exception
to bar a tort claim that was “inextricably intertwined” with a previous state court proceeding).
27
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advocates of access to courts will argue the opposite—if litigants satisfy the
federal question or diversity requirements, they should proceed in federal
court, notwithstanding the domestic relations exception.36 The result is a
myriad of inconsistent applications of the domestic relations exception.
This lack of consistency matters: Not only is it important to ensure that
similarly situated litigants receive similar jurisdictional outcomes, which
avoids one litigant receiving a remedy while the other does not, it is also an
important American principle to protect the nuclear family as well as a
person’s rights regarding that family. When the federal judiciary created this
exception to its otherwise limited jurisdiction, then failed to properly determine
its application, it left federal involvement in family law matters open to
extreme variance. If federal courts are going to abdicate their responsibility to
hear cases within their subject matter jurisdiction, the doctrine determining
when that happens should be clear.
This Comment offers a solution: a new approach to the application of the
domestic relations exception. This Comment’s approach properly considers the
three competing values of the exception—stare decisis, federalism, and access
to courts—and accounts for them. It suggests a three-step analysis that will
result in a more consistent application of the exception, which will provide
significant progress in clearing the haze that currently surrounds the domestic
relations exception.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I examines Supreme Court
precedent to trace the origin and development of the domestic relations
exception. This Part examines every Supreme Court case that discusses the
exception. Central to this Part is the most recent Supreme Court case on point,
Ankenbrandt v. Richards.37 The line of cases demonstrates the Court’s ongoing
attempts to adhere to the precedential nature of the exception, while also trying
to balance the competing values of access to a federal forum and federalism.
This Part highlights the Court’s struggle with these three concepts, a struggle
that presents itself as inconsistencies in the domestic relations exception’s
application.
Part II surveys and critiques the current methods used by the federal
appellate courts to determine whether a matter falls within the purview of the

36
See, e.g., Reale v. Wake Cty. Human Servs., 480 F. App’x 195, 197 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(“[T]he domestic relations exception [does not] undermine federal question jurisdiction where it otherwise
exists.”).
37
504 U.S. 689 (1992).
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domestic relations exception. The approaches naturally cluster into four
groups. The first approach is what this Comment terms the “core-only”
approach. Courts that follow this approach only apply the exception to the
issuance or modification of divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.38 The
second approach is the “core and penumbra” approach, in which the domestic
relations exception blocks not only the core cases,39 but also “cases ‘on the
verge’ of being matrimonial in nature.”40 The third approach is the
“inextricably intertwined” approach, the inquiry being whether the federal
court’s remedy or analysis will overlap with that of the state.41 If so, the action
is prohibited by the exception. The fourth and final approach is a factor-based
method employed by the Eleventh Circuit, in which the court engages in a
balancing test to determine whether the matter may go forward in federal court
or instead is barred by the exception.42
Part III offers a three-step approach that accounts for the competing values
that underlie the domestic relations exception: stare decisis, federalism, and
access to courts. This Part identifies three inquiries to determine whether the
domestic relations exception should be applied in a matter before the federal
court. First, is the litigant affirmatively or functionally suing for divorce,
alimony, or child custody? If so, due to adherence to precedent, the domestic
relations exception prevents federal jurisdiction. If not, the court proceeds to
the second inquiry: Are there any significant state interests that should prevent
the matter from continuing in federal court? If the state’s interest is significant,
the domestic relations exception applies due to notions of federalism, and the
case would be dismissed. However, if there is not a significant state interest or,
per the third inquiry, there is an overriding necessity to provide the litigant
with access to a federal forum, the domestic relations exception is overcome,
and the case may proceed in federal court.
Part III also discusses the implications of a universal adoption of the
proposed test, which includes a respect for the underlying values of the
domestic relations exception and a crucial first step in reducing the current
judicial inconsistency. The Comment ends with a call for federal courts to
adopt a uniform process to determine the application of the domestic relations
exception, specifically the proposed three-step test.
38

E.g., Chevalier, 803 F.3d at 797.
The core cases are those that involve divorce, alimony, child custody, or all. Id.
40
Hamilton v. Hamilton-Grinols, 363 F. App’x 767, 769 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Friedlander v.
Friedlander, 149 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 1998).
41
E.g., Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1994).
42
E.g., McCavey v. Barnett, 629 F. App’x 865, 867 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
39
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HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION

This Part traces the origins and development of the domestic relations
exception by centering on a defining moment in the exception’s history, the
Ankenbrandt v. Richards decision.43 The Ankenbrandt decision is the Supreme
Court’s most recent full analysis of the domestic relations exception,44 in
which the Court reaffirmed the existence of the domestic relations exception
and endeavored to define its scope.45
This Part proceeds in four sections. Section A examines the genesis of the
domestic relations exception, illuminating that even at its inception, Justices
disagreed on its application.46 Section B focuses on the case law tracing the
exception’s creation until the Ankenbrandt decision. Case law reveals how the
scope of the exception confusingly evolves and constricts, setting the stage for
the desperate need for a clarifying message from the Supreme Court. Section C
discusses what should have been that clarifying message, the Ankenbrandt
case, and how the Supreme Court fell short. Section D examines Supreme
Court decisions since Ankenbrandt. It discusses how they too shed no light on
a consistent approach to its application. This Part ends with a summary of the
current state of the domestic relations exception and identifies matters still left
open as a result of Supreme Court precedent.
A. Origins of the Exception
The roots of the domestic relations exception trace back to an 1858
diversity lawsuit between ex-spouses.47 Barber v. Barber involved a wife who
sought to enforce an alimony decree against her husband.48 When domiciled in
different states, the wife sued in federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction.49
43

504 U.S. 689 (1992).
See infra Section I.D.
45
See Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 692 (granting certiorari to determine whether “there [is] a domestic
relations exception to federal jurisdiction,” and if so, whether “it permit[s] a district court to abstain from
exercising diversity jurisdiction over a tort action for damages”).
46
Compare Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 599–600 (1858) (holding that federal jurisdiction
was proper for the enforcement of an alimony decree), with id. at 602 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (“The Federal
tribunals can have no power to control the duties or the habits of the different members of private families in
their domestic intercourse[, because t]his power belongs exclusively to the particular communities.”).
47
See Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 694 (describing that “[t]he statements disclaiming jurisdiction over
divorce and alimony decree suits” in Barber are “technically dicta,” but “formed the basis for excluding
‘domestic relations’ cases from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts”). Although the exception was first
overtly addressed in Barber, earlier Supreme Court cases suggest that domestic relations matters are within the
power of the states. See, e.g., Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 108 (1847).
48
62 U.S. at 584.
49
Id. at 583–84.
44
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But whether the district court truly had jurisdiction turned out to be one of the
key issues in the case.50
To address whether it had jurisdiction, the Court looked at the subject of
the suit, the enforcement of an alimony decree.51 Then, for the first time, the
Court expressly “disclaim[ed] altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the
United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony.”52
In other words, federal courts do not have jurisdiction to issue or modify a
divorce or alimony decree, but did have jurisdiction to enforce an alreadyissued alimony decree, which was the situation in this case.53 Yet from that one
statement, the domestic relations exception was born.54
The first of many disagreements on the application of the domestic
relations exception appears in the case’s dissent, authored by Justice Daniel.55
Justice Daniel agreed that federal courts should not exercise jurisdiction over
domestic matters, but proposed that even the matter currently before the Court
should be barred.56 Thus, in Justice Daniel’s view, federal courts should not
issue, modify, or enforce an alimony decree.57 In contrast, the majority
construed the scope of the exception more narrowly, only applying it to cases
in which an alimony decree was issued or modified.58
Although the majority opinion did not provide any explanation for the
domestic relations exception, Justice Daniel’s dissent does. He explained that
the exception had its historical foundation in the jurisdiction of the English
Courts.59 Justice Daniel reasoned the jurisdiction of the federal courts was the
50

Id. at 592.
Id.
52
Id. at 584. This quoted language formed the basis for the domestic relations exception. Ankenbrandt,
504 U.S. at 694. Scholars note that this language has “[taken] on a life of its own,” being frequently applied
“as a general rule [to] the federal courts [that] consistently and repeatedly refused over the years to entertain
actions involving matrimonial status.” See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3609.1 (3d ed. 2009).
53
Barber, 62 U.S. at 592. The Court made it clear that its enforcement was “to the extent of what is
due.” Id. at 591. Accordingly, the Court would not order the husband to increase or decrease the amount of his
alimony payments because that would be modifying an alimony decree. Id.
54
Id. at 584 (“Our first remark is—and we wish it to be remembered—that this is not a suit asking the
court for the allowance of alimony. That has been done by a court of competent jurisdiction.”).
55
Id. at 600 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
56
Compare Barber, 62 U.S. at 599–600 (holding that “the court below has not committed error in
sustaining its jurisdiction over this cause”), with id. at 600 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
majority on “the authority of the courts of the United States to adjudicate upon a controversy and between
parties such as are presented by the record before us”).
57
Id. at 600 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
58
Id. at 599–600.
59
Id. at 605 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
51
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same as the chancery courts in England, which did not have jurisdiction over
divorce or alimony.60 Instead, those matters belonged to the ecclesiastical
courts.61 Since federal courts were the equivalent of chancery courts, Justice
Daniels concluded that like the chancery courts, federal courts did not have
jurisdiction over divorce or alimony.62
B. From Barber to Ankenbrandt
From Barber in 1858 to Ankenbrandt in 1992, the Supreme Court observed
the domestic relations exception in cases on a variety of matters. During this
134-year period, the Court heard suits on child custody,63 divorces between
individuals living in U.S. territories,64 and a divorce between an American and
non-American citizen.65 This section discusses each of these cases.
The first claim implicating the domestic relations exception following
Barber was In re Burrus.66 At issue in Burrus was whether the district court
had jurisdiction over a father’s custody petition for his daughter.67 The father
had previously sent his daughter to live with her grandparents, who later
claimed that they were the rightful custodians.68 Although the father and
grandfather were citizens of different states,69 the case concerned federal
question jurisdiction because the father had brought suit in a federal district
court seeking a writ of habeas corpus to recover custody of his daughter.70
The Supreme Court held that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the case.71 Even though the case invoked federal question jurisdiction, and
60

Id.
Id.
62
Id. It should be noted that over time, there has been a “debate over the accuracy of this historic
characterization [that] has cast doubt on the legitimacy of that rationale.” WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 52,
§ 3609 (citing Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 299 (2006)).
63
E.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 587 (1890).
64
E.g., De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 304 (1906); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 162–63
(1899).
65
Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 382, 384 (1930).
66
136 U.S. at 593–94.
67
Id. at 587, 593–94.
68
Id. at 587–88.
69
Id. at 587.
70
Id. The father in this case attempted to use the federal habeas corpus statute to compel the grandfather
to return custody of the child to him. Id. The Court observed that federal habeas jurisdiction extended only to
cases in which a party was “held in custody for an act done by or under the authority of” federal law, or in
which the imprisonment violated federal law. Id. at 591.
71
Id. at 594 (“As to the right to the control and possession of this child, as it is contested by its father
and its grandfather, it is one in regard to which neither the Congress of the United States nor any authority of
the United States has any special jurisdiction.”).
61
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not diversity jurisdiction as in Barber, the Court applied the domestic relations
exception.72 The Court firmly announced that “[t]he whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws
of the [s]tates and not to the laws of the United States.”73 Without citing any
support for that proposition, the Court expanded the scope of the exception to
include not only issuing or modifying a divorce or alimony decree, but also
child custody decrees.74
After Burrus, the Supreme Court declined to apply the domestic relations
exception in two cases involving U.S. territories. Both Simms v. Simms and De
La Rama v. De La Rama involved divorces arising from Arizona and the
Philippines, respectively,75 thereby falling directly within the scope set out
earlier by the Court in Barber.76 However, in contradiction to its statement in
Barber, wherein the Court expressly disclaimed jurisdiction on “the subject
of divorce,”77 the Court in Simms and De La Rama both found persuasive that
Congress had enacted a statute that gave power to the federal courts over the
federal territories involved.78 That power “covers the domestic relations, the
settlement of estates, and all other matters which, within the limits of a [s]tate,
are regulated by the laws of the [s]tate only.”79 In other words, Congress
granted these federal territories general jurisdiction, including jurisdiction over
matters typically left for the states, such as domestic relations issues.80 Thus
the Court distinguished the two cases from Barber because Congress had given
federal courts jurisdiction over domestic relations matters in federal
territories,81 and these cases involved federal territories.82
The last case discussing the domestic relations exception before
Ankenbrandt was Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler.83 In contrast to Simms and De

72

Id. at 593–94.
Id. Although this assertion cited to no case precedent, it has become one of the most oft-cited
Supreme Court quotes on the domestic relations exception. Hereinafter, this Comment refers to this language
as the “Burrus holding.”
74
Id.
75
De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 304 (1906); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 162–63
(1899).
76
Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858).
77
Id.
78
De La Rama, 201 U.S. at 307–08; Simms, 175 U.S. at 168.
79
Simms, 175 U.S. at 168.
80
Id.
81
See De La Rama, 201 U.S. at 307–08; Simms, 175 U.S. at 167–68.
82
De La Rama, 201 U.S. at 308; Simms, 175 U.S. at 168 (explaining that when the law of a territory
rather than a state is at issue, Congress has power to legislate).
83
280 U.S. 379, 379 (1930).
73
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La Rama, the Supreme Court invoked the exception to decide that the federal
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter.84 After being sued by his wife for
divorce and alimony in state court, Popovici, a foreign citizen stationed in the
United States as a vice-consul, objected to the state court’s jurisdiction.85
Popovici argued that according to Article III of the Constitution,86 only the
Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over suits involving him, a viceconsul.87
The Court rejected Popovici’s argument.88 Despite the patent constitutional
language that seemed to be in Popovici’s favor, the Court determined that the
words “ha[d] to be interpreted in the light of the tacit assumptions upon which
it is reasonable to suppose that the language was used.”89 At the time the
Constitution was adopted, one of those “tacit assumptions” was that federal
courts do not hear domestic relations matters; instead, these matters belong to
the states.90 Thus, in direct contradiction to Simms and De La Rama, in which a
federal court exercised jurisdiction over divorces, in Popovici the Court
announced that “the jurisdiction of the [c]ourts of the United States over
divorces and alimony always has been denied.”91
The decisions concerning the domestic relations exception thus far
illustrate the Supreme Court’s strong preference for federalism. In the previous
three cases, Burrus, Simms, and Popovici, the Court made strong statements
concerning the fact that domestic relations is an area of the law traditionally
regulated by the states, and should be left to the states.92 So strong was that
assertion that the Court applied the exception with equal force to both diversity
and federal question cases.93 But that inherent tension—when litigants have
84

Id. at 383–84.
See id. at 382.
86
“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
87
See Popovici, 280 U.S. at 382–83.
88
See id. at 383.
89
Id. at 383.
90
See id. at 383–84 (“If when the Constitution was adopted the common understanding was that the
domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the [s]tates, there is no
difficulty in construing the instrument accordingly . . . .”).
91
Id. at 383.
92
See id. at 383–84 (noting that federal courts do not hear domestic relations matters, instead they
belong to the states); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168 (1899) (asserting that domestic relations matters are
“within the limits of a [s]tate, [and] are regulated by the laws of the [s]tate only”); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586,
593–94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to
the laws of the [s]tates and not to the laws of the United States.”).
93
Compare Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593–94 (federal question jurisdiction), with Popovici, 280 U.S. at 382–
83 (diversity jurisdiction).
85
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met the requirements for access to a federal court on one hand, while the
exception stripped that access on the other—left many lower courts in a haze.
The Ankenbrandt decision represents the Court’s attempt at clarification.
C. The Ankenbrandt Decision
At the time of the Ankenbrandt decision, the law on the domestic relations
exception as set out by the Supreme Court was in a deep haze. Although many
understood the Burrus holding94 (which of course included the issuance and
modification of decrees involving divorce, alimony, and, as a result of Burrus,
child custody),95 there was little consensus about related matters, such as
adoption, guardianship, and child abuse.96 Turning to the Court’s proffered
rationale for the exception proved futile since the Supreme Court had never
provided a consistent justification for the exception.97 The Supreme Court
attempted to clear the haze with the 1992 decision of Ankenbrandt v.
Richards.98
In Ankenbrandt, Carol Ankenbrandt, a Missouri citizen, sued her children’s
father and his “female companion,” who were both citizens of Louisiana.99
Relying on the court’s diversity jurisdiction, Ms. Ankenbrandt sued in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.100 Ms. Ankenbrandt
“sought monetary damages for alleged sexual and physical abuse” of her
children by the respondents.101
The district court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction,102 citing the Burrus holding.103 The Court of Appeals
affirmed in an unpublished opinion.104 From there, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine if the domestic relations exception to jurisdiction still

94

Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593–94.
Id.
96
For a thorough breakdown of the circuit split that existed before the Ankenbrandt decision, see Stein,
supra note 10, at 679–81.
97
For a discussion of various rationales offered for the exception, see Barbara Ann Atwood, Domestic
Relations Cases in Federal Court: Toward a Principled Exercise of Jurisdiction, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 571, 584–
92 (1984).
98
504 U.S. 689, 692–93 (1992).
99
Id. at 691.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 691–92.
103
Id. at 692. “The [district] court also invoked the abstention principles announced in Younger v.
Harris” to justify its dismissal. Id.
104
Id.
95
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existed, and if so, whether “it permit[ted] a district court to abstain from
exercising diversity jurisdiction over a tort action for damages.”105
Answering the first question, the Supreme Court held that the domestic
relations exception in fact existed.106 The Supreme Court noted that the words
in Barber v. Barber,107 “though technically dicta,” formed the basis for the
exception, even though the Barber Court “cited no authority” for its
announcement.108 The Ankenbrandt Court determined it would continue to
acknowledge the exception on three grounds. First, the exception must be
recognized as a matter of stare decisis.109 Second, the exception could now be
explained as a method of statutory construction—Congress has had ample
opportunity to amend the diversity statute considering the rule, but had chosen
not to do so.110 Third, the exception served public policy—states are better
equipped to monitor cases of this type since they have the judicial expertise
from having handled these cases for so long.111
The second question gave the Court the opportunity to redefine when the
exception should apply and delineate its scope. The Court answered that it
should only apply in a narrow set of cases, those “involving the issuance of a
divorce, alimony, or child custody decree.”112 The Court expressed concern
that “the lower federal courts have applied [the domestic relations exception]
in a variety of circumstances . . . [that] go well beyond the circumscribed
situations posed by Barber and its progeny.”113 It concluded that “the domestic
relations exception encompasses only cases involving the issuance of a

105
See id. (granting certiorari to determine: “(1) Is there a domestic relations exception to federal
jurisdiction? (2) If so, does it permit a district court to abstain from exercising diversity jurisdiction over a tort
action for damages?”). The Supreme Court also granted certiorari to a third question: “Did the District Court in
this case err in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris?” Id. at 692–93.
However, this question is inconsequential to the subject of this Comment and will not be discussed.
106
Id. at 694–95.
107
“We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of
divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to
divorce . . . .” Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858).
108
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 694.
109
Id. at 694–95 (noting that the Court was “unwilling to cast aside an understood rule that has been
recognized for nearly a century and a half”).
110
Id. at 700 (“When Congress amended the diversity statute in 1948 . . . , we presume Congress did so
with full cognizance of the Court’s nearly century-long interpretation of the prior statutes, which had construed
the statutory diversity jurisdiction to contain an exception for certain domestic relations matters.”).
111
Id. at 703–04 (“Issuance of decrees of this type not infrequently involves retention of jurisdiction by
the court and deployment of social workers to monitor compliance. . . . [S]tate courts are more eminently
suited to work of this type than are federal courts . . . .”).
112
Id. at 704.
113
Id. at 701.
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divorce, alimony, or child custody decree.”114 Although the Court conceded
that at the exception’s genesis it was only applied to suits for divorce and
alimony,115 the Court would continue to apply the exception to child custody
cases as a result of In re Burrus.116 This conclusion was facially unclear, since
In re Burrus involved federal question jurisdiction, not diversity jurisdiction.117
But the Ankenbrandt Court explained away this irregularity by stating that the
Burrus holding “has been interpreted by the federal courts to apply with equal
vigor in suits brought pursuant to diversity jurisdiction.”118 Thus, the Court’s
attempt to include child custody in the domestic relations exception, combined
with its failure to specify whether the exception truly applied to federal
question cases, left lower courts lost in the haze the Court attempted to
clarify.119
With the Ankenbrandt decision, the Supreme Court attempted to balance
the three values underlying the exception’s creation and duration. First,
regarding stare decisis, the Court determined it would continue to recognize
the exception even though when it was announced in Barber, the Court “cited
no authority and did not discuss the foundation for its announcement.”120
Second, concerning federalism, the Court noted that one of the reasons it
would continue to apply the exception was that states were better equipped to
monitor cases of this type since they have the judicial expertise from having
handled these cases for so long.121 Finally, regarding access to courts, the
Court signaled a willingness to honor this value by narrowing the application
of the exception.122 While the opinion is laudable for its recognition and
attempted balance of the exception’s three underlying values, it suffered from
two key problems.
First, the Court offered little guidance on matters associated with the core
domestic relations issues. All federal courts understood that the exception
prohibits a federal court from issuing “a divorce, alimony, or child custody

114

Id. at 704.
Id. at 701–02.
116
136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890).
117
Id. at 586, 591.
118
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703. Scholars examining this reasoning have criticized it as “convoluted.”
See Cahn, supra note 9, at 1082.
119
See infra Part II.
120
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 694.
121
Id. at 703–04.
122
See id. at 701.
115
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decree,”123 but what about related matters such as child support, guardianship,
adoption, neglect, and abuse?124 The Court wrote nothing regarding how the
domestic relations exception applies to these matters.
Because the Court omitted a discussion of related matters, some lower
courts look to a different part of the opinion, the portion on abstention, for
support. In the abstention portion, the Court noted that it may be appropriate
for federal courts to abstain from exercising subject matter jurisdiction “in a
case involving elements of the domestic relationship even when the parties do
not seek divorce, alimony, or child custody.”125 It is unclear how this statement
relates to the domestic relations exception given that it is separate from the
Court’s discussion of the exception.126 Because of this lack of clarity, many
courts were left wondering whether the abstention portion applies to the
exception.
Second, similar to the original domestic relations statement in Barber, the
information in the Ankenbrandt opinion about the domestic relations exception
is dicta. Because the exception did not apply in the matter before the Court, a
“decision on the scope of the [e]xception was not necessary.”127 Thus, some
courts implicitly rejected the discussion of the exception in Ankenbrandt, and
continued to rely on pre-Ankenbrandt cases as support.128 These two problems
have led to the circuit split on the scope of the exception that exists today.129

123
Id. at 690; see also Stein, supra note 10, at 679 (“With one notable exception, district courts agree[d]
that their jurisdiction [did] not extend to core suits.”).
124
See Stein, supra note 10, at 686 (asserting that “[t]he Ankenbrandt opinion is entirely silent about the
viability of federal adjudication of core enforcement cases”).
125
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 705.
126
Id.
127
Cahn, supra note 9, at 1084. One may find support for this proposition in Justice Stevens’s
concurrence in which he stated, “I would leave for another day consideration of whether any domestic
relations cases necessarily fall outside of the jurisdiction of the federal courts and of what, if any, principle
would justify such an exception to federal jurisdiction.” Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 718 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
128
See, e.g., Mitchell-Angel v. Cronin, No. 95-7937, 1996 WL 107300 (2d Cir. Mar. 8, 1996). In
Mitchell-Angel, the court cited pre-Ankenbrandt cases and applied the exception to federal question
jurisdiction cases, including the civil rights action in Mitchell-Angel. Id. at *2–3.
129
See infra Part III.
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D. From Ankenbrandt to the Present
In the wake of the Ankenbrandt decision, two rules definitively emerged.130
First, the domestic relations exception exists as a result of stare decisis,
statutory construction, and public policy.131 Second, it applies to issuances of
divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.132 Beyond that, “the Ankenbrandt
Court confused matters” by failing to offer an adequate explanation of when,
beyond the three named situations, a court should invoke the exception.133 In
other words, the Court did not provide guidance on the “difficult cases at the
margin.”134 Does child support fall within the exception? It is not within the
three situations named, but as Professor Naomi Cahn has observed, it is
“comparable to alimony because it is a form of ongoing wealth transfer” and
“closely related to child custody determinations because most state statutes
require the noncustodial parent to pay.”135 Because the Court has not provided
consistent guidance, we meet the problem of similarly situated litigants having
very different outcomes.136
After Ankenbrandt, the Supreme Court addressed the domestic relations
exception on two occasions. The first was a 2004 case called Elk Grove
Unified School District v. Newdow.137 Newdow involved a father, an atheist,
who challenged the use of the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance,
which his daughter recited daily at her public school.138 The mother of the
child, who also had exclusive legal custody, disputed having her daughter as a
party to the lawsuit.139 The mother believed “that her daughter would be
harmed if the litigation were permitted to proceed, because others might
incorrectly perceive the child as sharing her father’s atheist views.”140
Because the case’s true question involved a contentious constitutional
issue—whether small children could be told they were “under God” in public
schools every day—the Court evaded the difficult the question by relying on
130
Note that the use of the term “definitively” is subject to challenge. Some argue that the Supreme
Court’s discussion of the domestic relations exception in Ankenbrandt is merely dicta. See Cahn, supra note 9,
at 1083–84.
131
See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
132
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704.
133
Strasser, supra note 6, at 200.
134
Dunn v. Cometa, 238 F.3d 38, 41 n.1 (1st Cir. 2001).
135
Cahn, supra note 9, at 1084.
136
See supra INTRODUCTION.
137
542 U.S. 1 (2004).
138
Id. at 5.
139
Id. at 9.
140
Id.
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standing141 and the domestic relations exception.142 Summing up the rules
about the domestic relations exception and expanding its scope, the Court
noted:
One of the principal areas in which this Court has customarily
declined to intervene is the realm of domestic relations. . . . So strong
is our deference to state law in this area that we have recognized a
“domestic relations exception” that “divests the federal courts of
power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.” We
have also acknowledged that it might be appropriate for the federal
courts to decline to hear a case involving “elements of the domestic
relationship,” even when divorce, alimony, or child custody is not
strictly at issue.143

Thus, with forceful language, the Court did two things. First, it incorporated
the scope of the domestic relations exception as set by Ankenbrandt, divesting
federal courts of the authority to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody
decrees.144 Second, in a puzzling maneuver, the Court cited to the abstention
portion of Ankenbrandt to expand the scope of the exception to include matters
involving “elements of the domestic relationship.”145
To add to that confusion, the Court’s writing on the domestic relations
exception is dicta.146 The Court explicitly wrote, in a footnote, that the holding
does not rest on the domestic relations exception.147 Instead, the Court noted
that its “prudential standing analysis is informed by the variety of contexts,”
one of which is the domestic relations exception.148 Here, the father’s standing
depended on his relationship with his daughter, but because “disputed family
law rights [were] entwined inextricably” with his standing, the Court chose to
reverse the appellate court’s decision and dismiss the case.149 In these
situations, the Court wrote that “it is appropriate for the federal courts to leave
delicate issues of domestic relations to the state courts.”150

141

Id.
Id. at 12–14.
143
Id. at 12–13 (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703, 705 (1992)).
144
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704.
145
Newdow, 542 U.S. at 13 (quoting Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 705–06).
146
See id. at 13 n.5 (noting that the holding of the case does not rest on the domestic relations
exception).
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 10, 13 n.5, 17.
150
Id. at 13.
142
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The second occasion after Ankenbrandt in which the Supreme Court
addressed the domestic relations exception was Marshall v. Marshall.151
Although Marshall involved facts surrounding the probate exception to
diversity jurisdiction,152 the Court took the opportunity to discuss its cousin,
the domestic relations exception.153 The Court wrote that Ankenbrandt “reined
in the ‘domestic relations exception,’”154 noting that the “so-called” exception
applies only to a “narrow range of domestic relations issues.”155 But since the
domestic relations exception was not necessary to the Court’s holding because
the case was about the probate exception, the Court’s discussion of it is again
dicta.156
Since Marshall, the Supreme Court has not again discussed the domestic
relations exception at length. Thus, from the time the exception began in 1858
until now, the Supreme Court has taken several confusing steps concerning the
exception. First, the Court has applied the domestic relations exception to
matters that did not involve diversity jurisdiction.157 Second, the Court
confined the exception’s application in Ankenbrandt,158 but then seemed to
provide conflicting instruction in the dicta of the same case and in subsequent
cases.159 Third, the Court has consistently provided shifting, dubious rationales
for the exception’s existence.160
Taken together, the Court’s measures to clear the haze have been
unavailing—lower courts are still lost. Although some scholars predicted that
“the Supreme Court’s clear statement of the narrow confines of the [domestic
relations exception] may eliminate or at least sharply reduce [its] inconsistent
application,”161 this has not been the case. Instead, the domestic relations

151

547 U.S. 293, 293 (2006).
The probate exception to diversity jurisdiction denotes that federal courts have no subject matter
jurisdiction over probate matters and thus cannot directly probate a will or undertake the administration of an
estate. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 52, § 3610.
153
See Marshall, 547 U.S. at 299 (noting that like the domestic relations exception, the probate
exception is an exception to otherwise proper federal jurisdiction).
154
Id.
155
Id. at 299, 307 (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 701 (1992)).
156
Id. at 314–15.
157
See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890).
158
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 701, 704.
159
See Marshall, 547 U.S. at 307 (discussing the domestic relations exception even though the case
concerned the probate exception); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12–13, 13 n.5 (2004)
(noting that the holding does not rest on the domestic relations exception).
160
See Atwood, supra note 97, at 584–92.
161
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 52, § 3609.
152
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exception bars litigants in some circuits, while being inapplicable to the same
similarly situated litigants in other circuits.
II. CIRCUITS’ VARYING APPROACHES TO THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS
EXCEPTION
The background on the domestic relations exception in Part I highlights the
problem with the doctrine—the Supreme Court has never offered a holding
regarding the application of the exception or provided a definitive test.162 Thus,
lower courts apply Ankenbrandt inconsistently, leading to conflicting treatment
of similarly situated litigants in different jurisdictions.163 This Part examines
the lower courts’ various approaches.
The approaches used by the circuits to determine the application of the
domestic relations exception can be divided into four general methods. Each
section in this Part explores a different method. Section A describes the coreonly approach. Circuits that follow this method determine that the exception
only applies to the issuance or modification of divorce, alimony, and child
custody decrees.164 Section B explains the core and penumbra approach.165
Circuits that rely on this approach believe the exception applies to cases that
sound in family law or are “matrimonial in nature.”166 Section C discusses the
Eighth Circuit’s inextricably intertwined approach.167 With this method, the
Eighth Circuit examines whether the federal court’s remedy or inquiry will
overlap with that of a state court.168 Finally, Section D describes the Eleventh
Circuit’s factor-based approach, in which the court balances various identified
factors to determine if the exception will apply.169
The approaches used by various circuits reflect their attempts to
acknowledge and balance the competing values that underlie the domestic
relations exception: stare decisis, federalism, and access to courts. But the
problem that plagues these approaches is twofold. First, some circuits elevate
one value to the omission or downgrading of the others. Second, the
162
For an example of the Supreme Court expressly holding on the scope of a topic, see Sprint
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013) (“We have not applied Younger outside these three
‘exceptional’ categories, and today hold, in accord with NOPSI, that they define Younger’s scope.”).
163
See supra INTRODUCTION.
164
E.g., Chevalier v. Estate of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2015).
165
See, e.g., Friedlander v. Friedlander, 149 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 1998).
166
Hamilton v. Hamilton-Grinols, 363 F. App’x 767, 769 (2d Cir. 2010).
167
See, e.g. Wallace v. Wallace, 736 F.3d 764, 767 (8th Cir. 2013).
168
See, e.g., Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1994).
169
See, e.g., McCavey v. Barnett, 629 F. App’x 865, 867 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
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approaches are not always inclusive. Some do not account for the current
questions that make the exception’s application so inconsistent, such as
whether it applies to federal question jurisdiction. For these reasons, this
Comment ultimately advocates a three-step approach that appropriately
accounts for the competing values and provides a uniform method of
determining the applicability of the domestic relations exception.
A. The “Core-Only” Approach
The first method, and the method used by the First,170 Third,171 Fourth,172
Fifth,173 and Sixth174 Circuits, is the core-only approach. In Ankenbrandt, the
Supreme Court noted that “the domestic relations exception encompasses only
cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree.”175
Although this language may be viewed as dicta since the Court did not need to
discuss the exception on the case before it, beyond that, the exception did not
apply; courts that follow the core-only approach disagree, and view the
language as an explicit holding concerning the exception’s scope.176 The coreonly approach is one that promotes access to federal courts by only omitting
cases concerning those three claims. Since federal courts “have no more right
to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which
is not given,”177 all other cases may be properly heard in federal court if the
litigants otherwise meet the federal jurisdictional requirements.

170
See, e.g., Norton v. McOsker, 407 F.3d 501, 505 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The domestic relations exception
‘divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.’” (quoting
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992))).
171
See, e.g., Matusow v. Trans-Cty. Title Agency, LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining
that the plaintiff did “not seek the modification of a divorce decree, and the narrow domestic relations
exception [did] not divest the federal court of jurisdiction over her claims”).
172
See, e.g., Reale v. Wake Cty. Human Servs., 480 F. App’x 195, 197 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he domestic
relations exception encompasses only cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody
decree.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704)).
173
See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1231 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Federal courts have long
divested themselves of jurisdiction over only the issuance of divorce, alimony, and child custody
decrees . . . .”).
174
See, e.g., Chevalier v. Estate of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2015) (“The message from
Ankenbrandt and Marshall is clear: the domestic-relations exception is narrow, and lower federal courts may
not broaden its application.”).
175
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704.
176
See, e.g., Chevalier, 803 F.3d at 795 (“The Court made clear [in Ankenbrandt] that the domesticrelations exception extended no further than ‘cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child
custody decree.’” (quoting Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704)).
177
Id. at 795 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 298–99
(2006)).
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Illustrative of the core-only approach is Chevalier v. Estate of Barnhart.178
In Chevalier, the issue was whether the domestic relations exception barred a
claim concerning one spouse’s default on loans from the other spouse.179 Once
the couple separated, Chevalier sued Barnhart for repayment of the loans in
federal district court, asserting diversity jurisdiction because she was a
Canadian citizen and Barnhart was a citizen of Ohio.180 Before answering
Chevalier’s complaint, Barnhart sued for divorce in Canada.181 The district
court subsequently dismissed Chevalier’s claim via the domestic relations
exception.182 It reasoned that although Chevalier “framed her complaint in
terms of contract and tort claims,” the domestic relations exception barred her
claims because she sought the “functional equivalent of a divorce
proceeding.”183
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the district court’s
reasoning.184 It held that “the domestic-relations exception to federal diversity
jurisdiction does not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction . . . unless ‘a plaintiff
positively sues in federal court for divorce, alimony, or child custody,’ . . . or
seeks to modify or interpret an existing divorce, alimony, or child custody
decree.”185 The court reviewed Ankenbrandt and noted that the Supreme Court
“expressed concern that ‘the lower federal courts ha[d] applied [the domesticrelations exception] in a variety of circumstances . . . [that] go well beyond the
circumscribed situations’ where it applies.”186 Ignoring the Supreme Court’s
language since Ankenbrandt, the circuit court implied that the district court’s
use of the domestic relations exception was another one of those
circumstances.
To explain its decision, the court wrote: “When analyzing the applicability
of the domestic-relations exception, we must focus on the remedy that the
plaintiff seeks . . . .”187 Here, Chevalier did not seek an issuance or
modification of a divorce or alimony decree.188 Instead, she “request[ed] that
the federal court adjudicate whether she is entitled to repayment for past-due
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Id. at 789.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 791.
Id. at 793.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 797.
Id.
Id. at 795 (alterations in original) (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 701 (1992)).
Id. at 797.
Id. at 798.
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loans.”189 That type of remedy, even though it involved the marital status of the
litigants, was not barred by the domestic relations exception.190
The core-only approach has significant support amongst the circuits. It
seems to provide a clear rule: if a litigant invokes the federal court’s diversity
jurisdiction to seek a modification or issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child
custody decree, then she is barred by the domestic relations exception.191 Yet
the approach suffers from at least two deficits. First, what if a litigant invokes
federal question jurisdiction to reach similar ends? The core-only approach
would seem to allow the case to go forward, even though a litigant is
functionally achieving the same result. If one of the exception’s values is
federalism, should federal courts permit a litigant to use artful pleading to
escape the application of the exception? Second, the core-only approach would
seem to allow related matters, such as abuse, neglect, guardianship, and
adoption, to proceed in federal court, undermining federalism and in
contradiction to at least some language by the Supreme Court.192
Two cases highlight the core-only approach’s federal question deficit:
Reale v. Wake County Human Services193 and Chambers v. Michigan.194 In
Reale, two parents filed a § 1983 action195 “claiming that state actors had
deprived them of their children without due process.”196 Although the district
court dismissed the case via the domestic relations exception, the appellate
court reversed and held first, that the exception only applies to “the issuance of
a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree,” and second, the exception only
applies to diversity, and not federal question, cases.197 Although the litigants,
seeking injunctive relief, could potentially use a § 1983 claim to obtain custody
of their children (which may be construed as the functional equivalent of
seeking the modification of a child custody decree), the suit was not barred by
the domestic relations exception. In a directly opposite conclusion, the court in
189

Id.
Id. at 797 (“The domestic-relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction does not apply when the
parties do not ask the federal court to perform these status-related functions—issuing a divorce, alimony, or
child-custody decree—even if the matter involves married or once-married parties.”).
191
See id.
192
See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992) (noting that it may be appropriate for federal
courts to abstain from exercising subject matter jurisdiction “in a case involving elements of the domestic
relationship even when the parties do not seek divorce, alimony, or child custody”).
193
480 F. App’x 195, 197 (4th Cir. 2012).
194
473 F. App’x 477, 479 (6th Cir. 2012).
195
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for individuals who assert that a person acting under color of
state law has violated their federal rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
196
Reale, 480 F. App’x at 197.
197
Id.
190
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Chambers held: “Even when brought under the guise of a federal question
action, a suit whose substance is domestic relations generally will not be
entertained in a federal court.”198 Thus, even though both circuits here use the
core-only approach, they vary on whether the exception applies to federal
question cases.
The second deficit is that the approach provides no guidance on handling
matters related to divorce, alimony, and child custody. This deficit is expressly
highlighted in Dunn v. Cometa.199 Although the claims at issue in Dunn
involved a breach of fiduciary duty and fell outside of the exception, the court
expressly noted the problem with the core-only approach.200 The court wrote in
a footnote that “this narrow construction of the exception,” that is, the coreonly approach, “leaves open difficult cases at the margin.”201 The court gave
no direction as to how to deal with those cases at the margin, even though they
implicate the same federalism concerns as the core cases. To handle that
problem, the Second202and Seventh203 Circuits employ the “core and
penumbra” approach.
B. The “Core and Penumbra” Approach
The second approach is the core and penumbra approach, which is used by
the Second204and Seventh205 Circuits, attempts to account for cases involving
abuse, neglect, guardianship, and adoption. The term “core and penumbra” is
derived from a Seventh Circuit case.206 Courts that use this method note that
the core of the domestic relations exception consists of cases involving the
issuance or modification of divorce, alimony, or child custody decrees, and the
penumbra consists of proceedings “that state law would require be litigated as
a tail to the original domestic relations proceeding.”207 Such claims would
include, for example, suits for child support or unpaid alimony.208 In both the
198

473 F. App’x 477, 479 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Firestone v. Cleveland Tr. Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215
(6th Cir. 1981)).
199
228 F.3d 38, 41 n.1 (1st Cir. 2001).
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
See, e.g., Martinez v. Queens Cty. Dist. Att’y, 596 F. App’x 10, 12 (2d Cir. 2015). The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals does not use the label “core and penumbra,” but nevertheless assesses the claims
using the same process.
203
See, e.g., Friedlander v. Friedlander, 149 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 1998).
204
See, e.g., Martinez, 596 F. App’x at 12.
205
See, e.g., Friedlander, 149 F.3d at 740.
206
Id. (“The domestic relations exception has a core and a penumbra.”).
207
Id.
208
Id.
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core and penumbra matters, the domestic relations exception would strip the
federal court of jurisdiction.
Like the core-only approach, courts that follow the core and penumbra
approach find endorsement for this approach in Ankenbrandt’s language. The
core cases are those that consist of suits for divorce, alimony, and child
custody, the narrow scope arguably set out by the Supreme Court in
Ankenbrandt.209 The penumbra cases are those that the Ankenbrandt Court
noted that may be appropriate for federal court abstention.210 These are cases
“involving elements of the domestic relationship even when the parties do not
seek divorce, alimony, or child custody.”211
The justification for the core and penumbra cases is highly questionable. It
comes from the part of the Ankenbrandt opinion concerning abstention as
opposed to the domestic relations exception.212 On the other hand, a reliance
on this portion of the Ankenbrandt opinion may now be reasonable since the
Supreme Court set the example, in a later case, by importing this same
language to apply to the domestic relations exception.213 Thus, some lower
courts have followed suit.
In its attempt to account for cases related to child custody, divorce, and
alimony, the core and penumbra approach promotes federalism. By allowing
state courts to address principal and related matters of domestic relations, the
federal courts leave those matters in the hands of those who already have much
proficiency in handling them. The approach also seems to account for domestic
relations suits brought as federal question cases.214 These suits would be part of
the penumbra, and thus barred. While applause is due for the core and
penumbra’s comity-focused procedure to clarify the scope of the exception,
this approach, like core-only approach, also poses problems.
The main problem is that no court has outlined exactly how to define when
a suit is inside or outside of the penumbra. This lack of instruction is
demonstrated in the Seventh Circuit case Friedlander v. Friedlander.215 In
209

Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992).
Id. at 705.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
214
See, e.g., Lynk v. LaPorte Superior Court No. 2, 789 F.2d 554, 563 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The judge-made
doctrine that prevents federal courts from adjudicating certain types of domestic relations case[s] under the
diversity jurisdiction can be restated as a doctrine of abstention also applicable to cases brought in federal
court under the federal-question jurisdiction.”).
215
See 149 F.3d 739, 740–41 (7th Cir. 1998).
210
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Friedlander, the court wrote that the domestic relations exception would bar a
suit for the collection of unpaid alimony, but would not bar a suit of wrongful
death over the murder of a father-in-law by his former son-in-law.216 These
examples, while helpful to define the extreme limits of the penumbra, provide
little guidance to courts seeking to apply this approach.
A secondary concern is the basis for which some courts justify the
penumbra of the exception. One court views Ankenbrandt’s narrow language
as dicta and implies that it does not have to follow it.217 Another court relies on
a different section of Ankenbrandt, which is dicta as it relates to the domestic
relations exception, and follows it.218 Thus we have one court disregarding
what they view as dicta, and another implementing dicta as precedent, but both
arriving at the same place. This highlights the Supreme Court’s ambiguity on
the exception and a need for an explicit holding concerning its application.
C. The Eighth Circuit’s “Inextricably Intertwined” Approach
The third method to determine the application of the domestic relations
exception is the Eighth Circuit’s inextricably intertwined approach.219 This
approach focuses on a litigant’s claims and whether they are inextricably
intertwined with a state proceeding, either in the remedy sought or the inquiry
the federal court must make.220 The Eighth Circuit used this approach in two
cases, Kahn v. Kahn221 and Wallace v. Wallace.222
In Kahn, the court held that a woman’s tort claims against her former
husband were barred by the domestic relations exception.223 In her complaint,
the wife alleged the same misconduct against her former husband as she had in
their divorce proceedings.224 The court concluded that the ex-wife’s claims,
“although drafted to sound in tort, [were] so inextricably intertwined with the
prior property settlement incident to the divorce proceeding that subject matter
jurisdiction [did] not lie in the federal court.”225 Since the proffered evidence

216

Id.
See id. at 740 (“A dictum in Ankenbrandt might be thought to cast doubt on the existence of the
penumbra . . . .”).
218
See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
219
See, e.g., Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1994).
220
Id.
221
See id.
222
See 736 F.3d 764, 765 (8th Cir. 2013).
223
Kahn, 21 F.3d at 860.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 861.
217
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would be the same as that in the divorce proceeding, and the conduct occurred
exclusively in the marriage, the domestic relations exception barred the federal
claims.226
Similarly, in Wallace v. Wallace, the court used the domestic relations
exception to bar an identity theft claim.227 As a result of an ongoing divorce
proceeding, the husband in Wallace learned that his wife “had used his social
security number and other personal information . . . to obtain several credit
cards” and charge nearly $40,000 on them.228 Although the state court labeled
the debt as marital, the husband invoked the federal court’s diversity
jurisdiction, suing for identity theft.229 Relying on Kahn to affirm the district
court’s decision, the court held that the domestic relations exception precluded
subject matter jurisdiction in this case.230 Because the injunctive and
declaratory relief the husband sought in federal court was “based on conduct
that occurred during the marriage” and would “undermine the judgment of the
state court,” his claims could not go forward.231
The Eighth Circuit’s approach respects notions of federalism and judicial
efficiency by allowing state courts to handle all matters inextricably
intertwined with domestic relations issues.232 While laudable for its efficacy,
how does one know when a claim is inextricably intertwined? The Eighth
Circuit provided some guidance by finding persuasive facts such as if the
conduct occurred during the marriage relationship or if the federal courts had
to inquire into matters handled by the state court,233 but these facts are true of
many domestic relations issues. Thus, the test is understandable in theory, but
may prove difficult to apply in practice. Without more guidance as to what a
court should look for to determine if a matter is inextricably intertwined, the
approach falls short.
D. The Eleventh Circuit’s Factor Approach
A final approach to applying the domestic relations exception is the
Eleventh Circuit’s factor approach.234 Like some courts that endorse the core
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234

Id. at 861–62.
Wallace, 736 F.3d at 765.
Id.
Id. at 767.
Id.
Id.
Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1994).
Wallace, 736 F.3d at 767.
See, e.g., McCavey v. Barnett, 629 F. App’x 865, 867 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
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and penumbra method, the factor approach relies on Ankenbrandt’s language
concerning abstention.235 The Eleventh Circuit outlined the following factors
for barring a matter under the domestic relations exception: “(1) [a] strong
state interest in domestic relations; (2) competency of state courts in settling
family disputes; (3) the possibility of incompatible federal and state decrees in
cases of continuing judicial supervision by the state; and (4) the problem of
congested federal court dockets.”236 When these factors are present, federal
courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over domestic relations
matters.237
Although the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly outlined the factors in recent
cases,238 it has not applied them since the 1978 case Crouch v. Crouch, in
which the factors were first introduced.239 Crouch involved a “suit between
former spouses for damages caused by the breach of a voluntary separation
agreement.”240 On appeal, the ex-husband argued that the lower court lacked
jurisdiction due to the domestic relations undertones of the dispute.241 To form
its decision, the court reviewed cases in which courts applied the exception and
deduced the aforementioned factors, but in Crouch the court found most of the
factors were lacking.242 The court found that the case only implicated the last
factor, congested federal dockets.243 That factor, standing alone, was not
enough to bar the suit.244
The Eleventh Circuit’s factor approach is the only one of the four
approaches that provides a true test on how to approach a domestic relations
jurisdictional issue. While it is useful and simple to apply, it suffers in other
respects. First, it fails to consider other significant factors that should be

235
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992) (noting that it may be appropriate for federal
courts to abstain from exercising subject matter jurisdiction “in a case involving elements of the domestic
relationship even when the parties do not seek divorce, alimony, or child custody”); see also Martinez v.
Queens Cty. Dist. Att’y, 896 F. App’x 10, 12 (2d Cir. 2015); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 149 F.3d 739, 740
(7th Cir. 1998).
236
Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998), certifying question to 734 So. 2d 1038 (Fla.
1999).
237
Id.
238
E.g., McCavey, 629 F. App’x at 867.
239
566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978). The districts that are now part of the Eleventh Circuit split off
from the Fifth Circuit effective October 1, 1981. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994.
240
566 F.2d at 487.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 488.
243
Id.
244
Id.
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included, such as whether a litigant relies on federal question as opposed to
diversity jurisdiction. Second, apart from a determination that the final factor,
congested federal dockets, is alone not enough to bar jurisdiction,245 the
Eleventh Circuit provides little direction on whether one factor is more
important than the others.
The approaches outlined in this section illustrate how the lower courts treat
the Supreme Court’s dubious precedent on the domestic relations exception.
Because the Court has never provided a test for the exception, and has been
inconsistent in its treatment of its scope, lower courts remain lost in the haze.
Trying to feel their way out, courts grapple with the values identified and
alluded to by the Supreme Court. The result is the four approaches outlined,
but, as demonstrated, each method has its flaws.
III. A NEW THREE-STEP ANALYSIS
The different approaches utilized by the circuits illustrate the lack of
uniformity in the federal courts. This lack of uniformity stems from the attempt
to balance the states’ interest to decide cases of local concern with an
individual’s interest in having access to a federal forum. Because the cases that
present themselves are highly fact-sensitive, the balance teeters between the
two interests, resulting in what we see now—various approaches leading to
conflicting outcomes among jurisdictions. This Comment proposes a new
three-step test that accounts for the underlying values of the exception,
provides uniformity, and will result in a scope that reduces the judicial
inconsistency across and within the circuits.
This Part proceeds in three sections. Section A describes the three-step
analysis in terms of its features and operation. Section B applies the three-step
approach to the factual scenario in this Comment’s introduction. Section C
discusses the implications of the new approach, which include respecting stare
decisis, fulfilling federalism, honoring access to courts, providing uniformity,
and reducing judicial inconsistency.
A. The Three-Step Analysis
In Ankenbrandt, the Court referenced and alluded to the values that
underlie the domestic relations exception: stare decisis, federalism, and access

245

Id.
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to federal courts.246 This Comment’s approach accounts for those values in its
three-step inquiry. The three steps of the test and each inquiry’s corresponding
value are:
1. Stare decisis: Is the litigant affirmatively or functionally seeking
an issuance or modification of a divorce, alimony, or child custody
decree?
2. Federalism: Does the state have a strong interest in the suit?
3. Access to federal courts: Is there an overriding necessity that a
federal court be accessible to the litigant?

If the answer to the first inquiry is yes, then the domestic relations exception
bars the suit. If not, a court then moves on to the second inquiry, which looks
at the state’s interest in the matter. If the state’s interest is significant, then the
case should be dismissed, unless, as the final inquiry indicates, there is a
superseding need to provide the litigant a federal forum. If so, the litigant will
continue in federal court, but if not, the federal court should dismiss the suit
via the domestic relations exception.
1. Is the Litigant Affirmatively or Functionally Seeking an Issuance or
Modification of a Divorce, Alimony, or Child Custody Decree?
The first inquiry in this analysis encourages the federal court to determine
if the litigant seeks one of the three remedies barred by the domestic relations
exception. In Ankenbrandt, which was the last Supreme Court case directly
discussing the exception, the Court wrote that the domestic relations exception
“encompasses only cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child
custody decree.”247 If the litigant seeks one of those remedies, the case is
barred, and no further inquiry is necessary.
The result of this inquiry will depend on the type of federal subject matter
jurisdiction on which the litigant relies. Usually, the domestic relations
exception is discussed in terms of diversity jurisdiction,248 but some scholars
have since begun to explore the exception as it relates to federal question cases
given the inconsistency amongst the circuits.249 But “[t]o say that a circuit split
exists, however, would paint too orderly a scene; several circuits have been

246
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 701, 703–04 (1992); see also Stein, supra note 10, at 679
(“With one notable exception, district courts agree that their jurisdiction does not extend to core suits.”).
247
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704.
248
See Harbach, supra note 8, at 137–38.
249
For a thorough overview of this inconsistency, see Silverman, supra note 8, at 1381–82.
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internally inconsistent in how they approach the issue.”250 Consider, for
example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In Williams v. Lambert,
the court announced that the domestic relations exception is inapplicable in
federal question cases.251 But just one year later, in Mitchell-Angel v. Cronin,
the same court indicated the opposite.252 More recently, the Second Circuit has
“expressly decline[d] to address whether the domestic relations exception to
federal subject matter jurisdiction applies to federal question actions.”253
Indeed, this type of internal judicial inconsistency highlights the renewed focus
on the problem by writers.
Unlike some scholars254 and courts,255 this Comment’s suggested analysis
does not advocate a blanket non-application of the domestic relations
exception to federal question cases.256 Because artful pleading can appear to
change a diversity case concerning domestic relations into a federal question
case alleging violation of federal civil rights,257 this analysis urges federal
courts to “sift through the claims of the complaint to determine the true
character of the dispute to be adjudicated.”258 In other words, this inquiry
charges federal courts to carefully look at the pleadings to determine if a
litigant is seeking a remedy concerning the issuance or modification of a
divorce, alimony, or child custody decree.
This process is equally true if the litigant is relying on diversity
jurisdiction. Of course, if a plaintiff files a petition to modify a child custody
order in federal court, the case would be barred by the domestic relations
exception. But if a litigant files a breach of contract action concerning a
custody agreement, he or she may be functionally doing the same thing.

250

Id. at 1382.
46 F.3d 1275, 1284 (2d Cir. 1995).
252
No. 95-7937, 1996 WL 107300, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 8, 1996) (“District courts in this [c]ircuit have
held that the exception includes civil rights actions directed at challenging the results of domestic relations
proceedings.”).
253
Ashmore v. Prus, 510 F. App’x 47, 49 (2d Cir. 2013).
254
See, e.g., Harbach, supra note 8, at 139 (arguing that “there is no principled, existing doctrinal basis
for expansion” of the domestic relations exception).
255
See, e.g., Atwood v. Fort Peck Tribal Court Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes, 513 F.3d 943, 947 (9th Cir.
2008) (“We therefore join the Fourth and Fifth Circuits in holding that the domestic relations exception applies
only to the diversity jurisdiction statute.”).
256
This argument is further supported by the fact that some of the earliest cases on the exception
involved federal question jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 596–97 (1890).
257
See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 48 F.3d 259, 260–61 (7th Cir. 1995) (dismissing, via the domestic relations
exception, a constitutional challenge to visitation proceedings which sought a vacating of the state’s visitation
order).
258
Firestone v. Cleveland Tr. Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1216 (6th Cir. 1981).
251
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The purpose of this inquiry is twofold. First, it honors stare decisis. The
Court has noted that the domestic relations exception has questionable
beginnings259 and some see it as unnecessary.260 But the exception has been
around for over a century and continues to serve important values. Thus, courts
should continue to acknowledge it as an important federalism doctrine.
Second, this inquiry permits a court to make an initial, threshold
determination that has the potential to dispose of the case without further
analysis. Since the application of the domestic relations exception to these suits
is unchallenged, quick disposal is possible. Thus, should a court determine that
the litigant is affirmatively or functionally suing for an issuance or
modification of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree, the domestic
relations exception bars the suit. If not, the court moves on the second inquiry:
the state’s interest.
2. Does the State Have a Strong Interest in the Suit?
The second inquiry concerns the state’s interest in the matter. For this
inquiry, the court will look at facts that support a conclusion that the case
should be handled in state court. The court should consider questions such as
whether a decision from the federal court will modify a state order, whether
there are current state actions pending on the same matter, whether there is a
“threat that a feuding couple will play one court system off another,”261 or
whether there are unique state laws that will inform the decision. Together,
these facts can give rise to the state’s interest in the matter.
Some courts are already performing many of the factual inquiries relevant
to this step. An example of a court assessing this step is found in the 1992 case
Johnson v. Thomas.262 In Johnson, the plaintiff invoked the federal court’s
diversity jurisdiction to sue Mary Thomas, the plaintiff’s former wife/domestic
partner.263 Thomas’s marital status was at the time being litigated in state court
because when she married the plaintiff, she was also married to another

259
See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 694 (1992) (noting that when the Court first announced
the exception, it cited no precedent); Atwood, supra note 97, at 578–84.
260
See Calabresi & Sinel, supra note 7, at 754–55 (arguing that the domestic relations exception is an
archaic doctrine and should be overruled); Emily J. Sack, The Domestic Relations Exception, Domestic
Violence, and Equal Access to Federal Courts, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1441, 1511 (2006) (“The overruling of
the domestic relations exception is a critical step in the process toward equality.”).
261
Johnson v. Thomas, 808 F. Supp. 1316, 1319 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
262
Id. at 1320.
263
Id. at 1317.
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man.264 In federal court, the plaintiff claimed that he and Thomas entered into a
domestic partnership agreement before their divorce whereby the plaintiff
agreed to pay for Thomas’s college education.265 In exchange she would
provide him with professional services upon graduation.266 Among other
claims, the plaintiff alleged violation of that contractual agreement, causing
him emotional distress and leaving Thomas with unjust enrichment.267
Thomas filed a motion to dismiss based on the domestic relations
exception, which the district court granted.268 Key to the court’s decision was
the state’s interest, which was significant. The court found four facts
persuasive. First, the parties had pending cases in the state courts of Michigan,
Texas, and Iowa, all involving the marital status of the litigants.269 Second, in
the state court of Michigan, with few exceptions, the claims were identical to
those presented in the federal court.270 Third, the claims that were not identical
depended upon the resolution of the marital status of the litigants.271 Fourth,
the court noted the plaintiff “appear[ed] to have filed lawsuits in as many
jurisdictions as possible in the hope of achieving a favorable result in one [of
them].”272 Taken together, these facts were strong enough for the court to
dismiss the claim via the domestic relations exception.
There is some debate on whether the interest of the states in domestic
relations is still a “sufficient justification” for the exception, especially given
the significant amount of federal legislation around family law. 273 Despite that
fact, and despite the drastic changes in family law since the genesis of the
exception,274 family law is still currently and traditionally a matter for the
states. While the fundamental right to marry may be announced by the federal

264

Id.
Id.
266
Id.
267
Id. at 1318.
268
Id. at 1321.
269
Id. at 1320.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
Justice Blackmun shared this concern in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 715 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
274
In her article, Professor Emily Sack concludes that the domestic relations exception “may be best
explained as a description of the inability to establish diversity in divorce and alimony cases, primarily because
at the time of these early cases a married woman could not establish a domicile separate from that of her
husband.” Sack, supra note 260, at 1445. During that time, married women had few rights. See Richard H.
Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1368 (1983). Now, of course,
women can live separately, whether locally or internationally, from their husbands.
265
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government, the policies and procedures for getting married are determined by
the states.275 Therefore, if the state’s interest is implicated, the domestic
relations exception should apply. But if the state’s interest is not strong or if it
is overridden by the litigant’s unique need for access to a federal forum, the
case should proceed in federal court.
3. Is There an Overriding Necessity to Provide the Litigant with Access to a
Federal Forum?
The final inquiry in this Comment’s proposed approach is whether there is
an overriding necessity to provide the litigant with access to a federal forum.
This is mainly demonstrated in a litigant’s constitutional challenge to a state
action or law. Countless Supreme Court cases implicate legal issues that
concern the family. The Court has reviewed state laws about who may
marry,276 procedures in place for divorce proceedings,277 parental rights
regarding child rearing and education,278 and individuals’ rights of procreation
and contraception.279 The domestic relations exception did not, and should not,
block these constitutional claims as they serve the important value of access to
a federal court. Thus, if a federal court appropriately characterizes a litigant’s
claim as one challenging the constitutionality of a state’s law or action, it will
override the state’s interest and the claim will continue in the federal forum.
B. Applying the Test
The previous section outlines the three-step approach advocated by this
Comment. The approach first asks if a litigant is affirmatively or functionally
suing for divorce, alimony, or child custody. If so, due to stare decisis, the
domestic relations exception prevents federal jurisdiction. If not, the court
proceeds to the second inquiry: Is there any significant state interest that
should prevent the matter from continuing in federal court? If the state’s
interest is significant, then the case should be dismissed, unless, as the final
275
See, e.g., State Laws on Marriage, FINDLAW, http://family.findlaw.com/marriage/state-laws-onmarriage.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2017).
276
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (finding a fundamental right to marry
for those of the same sex); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that “[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial
discriminations”).
277
See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (finding unconstitutional a state statute that
required the payment of fees to commence divorce proceedings).
278
See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (holding that parents have a right to
send their children to private school).
279
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
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inquiry indicates, there is a superseding need to provide the litigant a federal
forum. If so, the litigant will continue in federal court, but if not, the federal
court should dismiss the suit via the domestic relations exception.
Consider the test’s application to the factual situation presented in this
Comment’s introduction. In the scenario, a divorced mother and father are
entrenched in a bitter legal dispute concerning their children’s custody and
visitation. The mother has filed claims in her state court and in the state court
where the father resides. Relying on diversity jurisdiction, she files a claim in
her federal court for tortious interference with visitation rights.
In applying this Comment’s approach, the first inquiry is whether the
mother is affirmatively or functionally seeking a divorce, alimony, or child
custody decree. Based on these facts, it does not seem so. The mother’s claim
concerns her visitation rights, which does not fall within the named core cases.
As such, the federal court would move on to the second inquiry, the state’s
interest, which seems high in this case. The mother has filed claims in two
state courts, presumably to litigate the same matter. Therefore, this may be a
situation in which the mother is trying to forum shop.280 Since the fact pattern
implicates the state’s interest, the court would move on to the third inquiry:
whether there is an overriding necessity to provide this litigant with access to a
federal forum. The scenario does not give that impression. There is no
indication that this mother is challenging the constitutionality of a state law or
action. Thus, in this circumstance, the domestic relations exception would
apply, and the federal court should dismiss the claim.
C. The Test’s Implications
There are two primary implications of this Comment’s proposed test. First,
the three-step method provides a standardized approach to the application of
the domestic relations exception. As the law currently stands, there is no
uniform method that the federal courts employ to determine if the domestic
relations exception applies. Due to that lack of uniformity, litigants across281
and within the circuits282 meet opposing jurisdictional outcomes. This
Comment provides a uniform approach.

280
See Johnson v. Thomas, 808 F. Supp. 1316 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (implying that preventing
forum shopping is a strong state interest).
281
282

See supra INTRODUCTION.
See supra notes 251–53 and accompanying text.
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Second, this Comment’s three-step inquiry is one that properly accounts
for the important values that underlie the exception’s creation and continued
existence. The test first recognizes the Supreme Court’s existing precedent,
noting that as a matter of stare decisis, the domestic relations matter will bar
suits for divorce, alimony, or child support. The test then moves on to assess
the important federalism value of a state’s interest. Federal courts defer to
states in many ways,283 and the domestic relations exception is no different. If
the state’s interest is high, the matter should typically be left to the states. But
if there is no significant state interest or if there is a unique need to provide the
litigant access to federal forum, the competing value of access to federal courts
will override the state interest, and the domestic relations exception will not
apply. The proposed test represents a balancing of all the values that underlie
the exception, rather than elevating one at the expense of another.
CONCLUSION
The scholarship surrounding the domestic relations exception typically
promotes an all-or-nothing method. Some advocate abolishing the exception,
or that it should only apply to diversity cases and never to federal question
cases. This Comment’s approach does not suggest either of those extreme
views. Instead, this Comment highlights and accounts for the values that
underlie the exception and proposes a uniform approach to its application. It
urges federal courts to adopt a test that allows the judiciary to address the
exception’s competing values and thoroughly assess each unique, factual
presentation. The desired result is a uniform approach to the domestic relations
exception, a more consistent application, and, ultimately, a better-defined
scope.
KARLA M. DOE∗
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Other areas of state court deference exist in abstention doctrines, deference in federal habeas corpus,
the general rule that lower federal courts should not sit in review of state courts, and rules surrounding state
high court review. See generally Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases
Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1246 (2004).
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